Change or Continuity in US-Latin American Policy: the Obama Record by Randall, Stephen J.
There has been little praise and considerable 
criticism of the Latin American policies of the 
first presidential term and the early stages of the 
second administration of Barack Obama. It is 
understandable that his administration has had 
major distractions domestically and internatio-
nally with the fallout from the financial crisis, 
political wrangling over health care reform, 
crises in Egypt and Syria, sable rattling from 
North Korea, the need to continue to build a 
stable relationship with China, and winding 
down wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since the 
mid-term Congressional elections in 2010, the 
President has also faced congressional deadlock 
over virtually every administration initiative, 
from the confirmation of nominees to execu-
tive positions to immigration reform. Given 
those challenges and what had to be priorities, 
it was inevitable that Latin American policies 
would suffer to some degree. Condolences and 
understanding aside, the gap between Presi-
dent Obama’s lofty rhetoric and actual policy 
accomplishments is significant and growing. 
Latin American Perspectives (2011), for instan-
ce, recently characterized his administration’s 
policies as “dangerous complacencies.” Other 
commentators have suggested there is more 
continuity than change from the George Bush 
policies which he so vigorously criticized in 
2008 (2011, pp. 14-28). This paper reviews 
the regional policies, successes and failures, of 
the administration over the past 5 years with 
particular focus on Honduras, Colombia and 
Mexico, three of the regional countries which 
have posed the most significant challenges.
On Cuban policy during the campaign, 
Obama was explicit in calling for change at 
least in terms of lifting travel restrictions and 
controls on remittances for Cuban Americans 
with family on the island. Speaking before the 
Cuban American Foundation in Miami in 
May 2008 he pledged to immediately allow 
unlimited family travel and remittances. He 
also indicated that he was prepared, with pro-
per preparation, to meet with Raul Castro. He 
made no reference to the embargo. On broader 
Latin American policy he was critical of the 
U.S.-Colombian trade agreement, which both 
he and Hillary Clinton criticized in the Demo-
cratic Party primary campaign (Strassel, 2008). 
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Once he had secured the nomination and 
moved into the presidential campaign against 
Republican John McCain, Obama made few 
references to Latin American issues; they sim-
ply did not resonate with the electorate in the 
fall of 2008. The bbc’s Latin American analyst 
James Painter predicted that there would be a 
change in tone but little substantive change in 
actual policy with an Obama administration1.
The first administration began with a 
mixture of the same optimistic and positive 
rhetorical flourishes which had characterized 
the 2008 presidential election campaign. There 
had been a great deal of popular support for 
the Obama candidacy in Latin America, partly 
because he was African-American and partly 
because of his democratic, liberating and inspi-
rational message of change. Brazilian President 
Inácio Lula da Silva stressed the significance 
of Obama’s race (Erikson, 2010, p. 7). Only a 
few months after taking office, in April 2009, 
speaking before the Fifth Summit of the Ame-
ricas in Trinidad, Obama spoke of a new era in 
U.S.-Latin American relations and pledged to 
respect sovereignty and diversity in the region. 
His commitment was unequivocal: “I know 
that promises of partnership have gone unfulfi-
lled in the past, and that trust has to be earned 
over time. While the United States has done 
much to promote peace and prosperity in the 
hemisphere, we have at times been disengaged, 
and at times we sought to dictate our terms. 
But I pledge to you that we seek an equal 
partnership. There is no senior partner and 
junior partner in our relations; there is simply 
engagement based on mutual respect and com-
mon interests and shared values. So I’m here to 
launch a new chapter of engagement that will 
be sustained throughout my administration.” 
President Obama identified a number of spe-
cific areas in which he sought improvement: 
stimulating economic growth; supporting an 
expansion of Inter-American Development 
Bank lending capacity; combating inequality 
and creating prosperity from the bottom up; 
addressing violence and insecurity; reducing 
U.S. demand for illicit drugs; stopping the 
illegal flow of arms by giving priority to rati-
fication of the un Protocol on Illicit Traffic in 
Firearms and the Inter-American Convention 
Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Traffic-
king in Firearms; establishing an Energy and 
Climate Partnership for the Americas; and “a 
new beginning with Cuba”2.
The record since 2009 has been disappoin-
ting when measured against the promises. On-
ce in office there was a minor initiative to ease 
travel restrictions to Cuba, but by the time of 
the 6th Summit of the Americas in Cartagena 
in 2012, President Obama indicated that there 
would be no change in U.S.-Cuban policy in 
spite of the almost unanimous support for a 
reintegration of Cuba into the Inter-American 
system by countries in the hemisphere, Canada 
being the other opposition. The isolated na-
ture of the U.S. position on Cuba is reflected 
1 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/us_elections_2008/7710855.stm. 
2 Fifth Summit of the Americas. Recuperado de http://www.trinidadandtobagonews.com/5summit/obama170409.
html.
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in the un vote as well. The year that Obama 
took office the General Assembly voted 187-
2 condemning the embargo policy, with only 
Israel joining the United States in the vote. 
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton 
made the curious statement in 2010 that it 
was her personal opinion that the Castros did 
not want a normalization of relations because 
it would expose their policies for the failures 
that they have been3. Certainly there was no 
hint from her of a shift in U.S.-Cuba policy.
Nor was there any sign of significant 
change on Cuban policy in the first several 
months of the second term. Former Senator 
John Kerry, Clinton’s successor as Secretary of 
State, has signaled no change. Cuba was still 
on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. In 
February 2013 the New York based Council on 
the Americas and the Washington based Cuba 
Study Group both called on the administration 
to lift the embargo. The administration did not 
respond. In May 2013, as a possible sign of a 
U.S. overture to reduce tensions with Cuba, 
a US court allowed René Gonzalez to return 
to Cuba. Gonzalez was one of the Cuban Five 
who had been in a U.S. prison until 2011 ser-
ving time for engaging in espionage (Hayden, 
2013). Any significant shift in policy toward 
Cuba is unlikely in the balance of Obama’s 
presidency. There is little appetite for such 
change in Congress or in the Cuban-American 
community with the exception of the libera-
lization of travel and remittance restrictions. 
Any Congressional shift is also unlikely given 
the fact that Secretary of State John Kerry’s 
successor as chair of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee is Robert Menendez of 
New Jersey, who has consistently opposed any 
normalization of relations.
Where Kerry has been able to shift policy 
directions is on relations with Venezuela, with 
which the United States has had a troubled 
relationship for a decade, largely because of 
the intense anti-American policies pursued 
by the late president Hugo Chavez. In early 
June 2013 Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign 
Minister Elias Jose Jaua, the first cabinet level 
meeting between the two countries in several 
years, and Kerry’s first Latin American trip 
since taking office. There was some expression 
of hope that there would be a normalization 
of relations and an exchange of ambassadors 
in the near future4.
With respect to other promises the Presi-
dent made in Trinidad, as of 2013 the United 
States had not ratified the un Protocol on 
Illicit Traffic in Arms nor the Inter-American 
Convention, in spite of the heightened atten-
tion to gun control following the devastating 
shooting of school children in Newtown, 
Connecticut in late 2012. The energy initia-
tive had produced some results. By 2012, the 
U.S. had invested approximately $150 million 
in support for a variety of projects in the re-
gion, from electrification projects to training 
programs, the Caribbean Renewable Energy 
Strategy, and a number of national energy 
research centers. On narcotics, security and 
3 Reported by Reuters (April 9, 2010).
4 Mallett, R. Venezuela-U.S. Relations may improve. Venezuelanalysis.com.
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trade policies, however, critics argue that the 
administration has simply maintained and 
extended the initiatives of the Clinton and 
Bush administrations, from Plan Colombia 
to the Iniciativa Mérida in Mexico and the 
conclusion of Bush administration negotia-
ted free trade agreements with Colombia and 
Panama in spite of opposition from his own 
party over perceived human rights issues. Nor, 
although it was not solely a Latin American 
issue, did Obama follow through on his very 
vocal commitment to close the Guantánamo 
detention center.
The relative neglect of Latin America, 
with a few important exceptions, is indicative 
of a much broader and more fundamental shift 
in the relationship between the United States 
and the region. The United States simply does 
not have the power or relevance it once had. 
The decline of U.S. influence in the region 
is reflected not only in the success which the 
now late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez 
had in extending his Bolivarian vision and oil 
fueled influence into the Caribbean, Central 
America and the Andean region, but perhaps 
more importantly in the emergence of Latin 
American-led regional organizations in which 
neither the United States nor Canada is re-
presented (Congressional Research Service, 
2012). Such organizations go beyond such 
regional trading blocs as mercosur. The first 
of the more recent organizations is unasur, 
the Union of South American Nations, which 
was established in 2008 at a summit in Brazil. 
It is essentially an integration of the Mercosur 
countries with those of the Andean Pact and is 
modeled on the European Union. It includes 
12 countries and a Latin American parliament 
in Bolivia. A second is celac, the Communi-
ty of Latin American and Caribbean States, 
established in Caracas in 2011. Its objective 
is to advance regional integration, and the 
organization includes 33 countries. Such ini-
tiatives are indicative of the growing sense of 
economic, political and diplomatic power in 
Latin America, most striking in the case of Bra-
zil, whose inclusion among the bric (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China) countries is an indication 
of its capacity to play a more important role 
on the world stage. The efforts of Central and 
South American countries in the past decade 
to strengthen their economic relationships in 
particular with China, Europe and even Iran 
have reflected this broader tendency to distan-
ce themselves from the United States and to 
build more complex economies and political 
linkages. As two analysts suggested, “a more 
self-confident and autonomous majority in 
Latin America has sometimes sought a policy 
shift with regard to highly sensitive topics, such 
as drugs, immigration and Cuba.” (Whitehead 
& Nolte, 2012). Those initiatives were not 
limited to Chavez’s Venezuela, but included 
such U.S. allies as Colombia and Mexico.
On one level, this effort on the part of 
Latin American countries to distance themsel-
ves from the United States is ironic since the 
economic importance of the United States to 
the region remains strong even if it has decli-
ned since 2000. In 2000, some 61% of Latin 
American exports went to the United States. 
By 2010, that had declined to 41%. The chan-
ge in U.S. exports to the region has shown a 
similar decline in that period from 55% to 
30.5%. Nonetheless, the United States is still 
the source for 20% of foreign direct inves-
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tment in the region and an estimated 90% of 
remittances (Whitehead & Nolte, 2012, p. 3).
A brief examination of Obama adminis-
tration policies toward three countries serves 
to illustrate a number of the basic features of 
the administration’s approach to the region, 
Honduras because of the 2009 constitutional 
crisis, Mexico because of the extent to which 
it poses challenges which are in part domestic 
and in part foreign policies, and Colombia, 
which because of Plan Colombia has had a 
special importance to the United States since 
the Clinton administration.
Honduras
The first major crisis and challenge in Latin 
America which the Obama administration 
faced came in Honduras. This was an impor-
tant litmus test for the relatively new adminis-
tration. What position it would assume when 
confronted by a military-backed coup would 
have important impact on the public percep-
tion of the extent to which the new adminis-
tration was in fact departing from past failed 
policies. In June 2009 the Honduran Congress 
and military removed from office leftist Presi-
dent Manuel Zelaya, contending that he was 
violating the constitution in his efforts to lift 
restrictions on presidential terms. Honduran 
congressman Roberto Micheletti was named 
interim president. The Obama administra-
tion had been working for some weeks prior 
to the coup in an effort to resolve differences 
between Zelaya and his opponents. There was 
admittedly a great deal of confusion at the ti-
me over the constitutionality of the process by 
which he was removed, the role of the Supreme 
Court, the Congress and the military, and that 
confusion was reflected in the response of the 
oas and some member states. Nonetheless, 
the Obama administration, along with the 
oas, the Bolivarian countries and unasur, 
condemned the removal as a violation of the 
Democratic Charter. In late June President 
Obama stated: “We do not want to go back 
to a dark past,” and added, “we always want 
to stand with democracy” (Malkin, 2009). 
The administration suspended $30 million 
in aid to Honduras, although this was only 
a small percentage of the total level of U.S. 
assistance to the country. The administration 
did not, however, break diplomatic relations 
and recall its Ambassador. Critics contended 
that administration officials were aware of the 
pending coup and condoned it. They also ar-
gued that the administration fell back into the 
anachronistic bipolar Cold War mentality of 
seeing the “left” in Latin America as a security 
threat to U.S. interests, a threat embodied in 
the anti-Americanism of Hugo Chavez (Latin 
American Perspectives, 2011, 14-28; Haugaard, 
2009). On July 5 the oas, acting on the basis of 
Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter, suspended Honduras.
Months of political and diplomatic wran-
gling ensued, along with mass public demons-
trations in Honduras in support of Zelaya, 
during which time ousted President Zelaya 
was given diplomatic asylum in the Brazilian 
embassy. During that interlude the adminis-
tration worked with Oscar Arias of Costa Rica 
in a failed effort to mediate a resolution which 
would have seen Zelaya returned to office. 
That and other efforts failed in the face of stiff 
resistance from the Honduran Congress and 
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opposition from U.S. Congressional Conser-
vatives to any solution which would restore Ze-
laya to power. Conservative Republicans in the 
Senate used the opportunity of the Honduran 
coup and the Brazilian opposition to block the 
confirmation of both the Obama nominee as 
ambassador to Brazil and the nominee as Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, actions which the German Institute of 
Global and Area Studies labeled the “hijacking 
of Latin American policy” (Whitehead & 
Nolte, 2012). Honduran authorities pressed 
on with their intention to hold new elections 
at the end of 2009. U.S. officials continued to 
work unsuccessfully to have Honduran offi-
cials accept a power sharing government. All 
efforts failed and the Obama administration 
took the easier and more pragmatic approach 
to a solution. In November, senior state de-
partment official Thomas Shannon indicated 
that the United States would recognize the 
results of the November 29 elections even if 
Zelaya was not returned to power. The Obama 
administration ultimately accepted the legiti-
macy of the elections and recognized the new 
government of Porfirio Lobo, in contrast to the 
response of most Latin American countries. 
Brazilian presidential adviser Marco Aurélio 
García commented at the end of November: 
“We have a strong sense of disappointment” in 
the U.S. position (Thompson, 2009).
Although on the surface the crisis en-
ded with the election and the inauguration 
of President Porfirio Lobo, the legacy of the 
coup and the perceived violations of human 
rights during the demonstrations which had 
followed the coup persisted. The interim 
government had suspended freedom of as-
sembly and speech in the period leading up 
to the November election (Joyce, 2010). In 
July 2011 the Honduran Truth Commission 
concluded that Zelaya had broken the law 
when he disregarded the ruling of the Supreme 
Court instructing him to cancel the June 2009 
referendum. At the same time, the Commis-
sion determined that his removal from office 
was also unconstitutional and that the action 
should be considered a coup. Finally, it ruled 
that the appointment of Micheletti as interim 
president was also unconstitutional.
The U.S. response to the impeachment of 
President Fernando Lugo in Paraguay in 2012 
was even milder. The Obama administration 
did not assess the Congressional impeachment, 
for failing to maintain social harmony, led by 
the conservative Colorado Party, as a coup, 
although there was some criticism for the haste 
with which the process was implemented. By 
contrast, Latin American condemnation of 
the removal of the reformist president who 
had pledged to address poverty and engage in 
land reform, was immediate. Brazil, Argentina, 
Uruguay and Chile withdrew their ambas-
sadors. unasur and Mercosur immediately 
suspended Paraguay. The oas did not sanc-
tion Paraguay and the Obama administration 
followed the oas lead. In April 2013 the oas 
sent official observers to monitor new elections 
which brought right wing Colorado Party can-
didate Horacio Cartes to power, ending what 
little opportunity there had been for substanti-
ve reforms which might have challenged large 
landowners and agribusiness.
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Mexico
If one considers that narcotics, arms and hu-
man trafficking, and immigration are among 
the three most important policy issues fa-
cing the United States in Latin America then 
Mexico is the country with which the Obama 
administration has most needed to “get policy 
right.” Few analysts would give the adminis-
tration passing grades in its Mexico policy. 
Immigration reform as of 2013 is still mired 
in the stew that has characterized Congressio-
nal politics. There is no consensus on how to 
deal with the estimated eleven million illegal 
immigrants in the United States. Conserva-
tives want even more security on the border 
with Mexico but are opposed to any of the 
arms control measures which might actually 
improve border security. Narcotics policies, in 
spite of rhetoric that recognizes that the war 
on drugs has been a failure, is still based on a 
mano dura approach. Obama has stated that 
he understands that American consumption of 
illegal narcotics is a major contributing factor. 
He has also made clear that he understands 
that guns flow from the United States into 
Mexico to meet the demand of criminal orga-
nizations, but those guns continue to flow five 
years after his election. It is understood that the 
President cannot control Congress and that 
the nra continues to wield power over many 
elected representatives who might otherwise 
support gun control. Indicative of that level 
of influence is the fact that the Bureau of To-
bacco, Alcohol and Firearms, under nra and 
Congressional pressures, stopped releasing 
data on the percentage of weapons seized in 
Mexico that had been purchased in the United 
States (Vanderbush, 2011).
President Obama’s election coincided 
with the militarization of the conflict with 
the narcotics cartels during President Felipe 
Calderón’s administration. He also inherited 
the Merida Initiative which allocated substan-
tial U.S. support to Mexican (as well as Central 
American) military and law enforcement as 
well as judicial officials to control narcotics 
production, trafficking and organized crime. 
In 2008, Congress appropriated $400 million 
for Mexico and an additional $65 million for 
Central America. In his first year in office Presi-
dent Obama signed another $300 million into 
law for the program. By 2012, the U.S. con-
gress had appropriated $1.6 billion under the 
program (U.S. Department of State, 2012). In 
2009, President Calderón sent 5,000 federal 
troops into Ciudad Juarez on the U.S. border. 
The city, and northern Chihuahua in general, 
had been the site of sustained conflict among 
competing drug cartels. The initiative yielded 
some limited success against the cartels but in 
the process thousands of civilians have also lost 
their lives. Scholars have shown statistically, 
for instance, that the militarization of the war 
against the cartels in Ciudad Juarez resulted 
in a significant increase in homicides against 
women (Méndez, 2013).
The election of pri candidate Enrique 
Peña Nieto in 2012 promised to bring a 
shift in Mexican policies, a scaling down of 
military operations against the cartels, more 
federal collaboration with state and munici-
pal authorities, more focus on the protection 
of human rights, and some attention to the 
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social and economic factors which give rise 
to criminal activity. He has also worked to 
develop a more effective working relations-
hip with the other leading political parties in 
Mexico in order to achieve reforms in such 
critical areas as energy, where there have been 
signs that the oil industry will be more open 
to foreign investment, as well as in education 
and communications. As Peter Hakim of the 
Inter-American Dialogue noted in early May 
2013 as President Obama met with his newly 
inaugurated Mexican counterpart, Mexico’s 
image in the United States was not positive. 
It was viewed as corrupt, with a weak human 
rights record, the source of most of the illegal 
immigration entering the United States, or 
already there, as well as the cause of border 
state violence and narcotics trafficking into 
the country. Yet, as Hakim also observed, it is 
economically significant to the United States, 
with some forecasts predicting that it will re-
place Canada as the largest trading partner of 
the United States in less than a decade. From 
a Mexican perspective, immigration reform in 
the United States is one of the most important 
objectives which the Obama administration 
could achieve, since it has long been a source 
of anger among Mexicans. Whether substan-
tial reform will be attained remains to be seen.
U.S.-Mexico relations are so closely tied 
to the broader debate over immigration policy 
and drug trafficking that it is difficult to say 
what is specific to Mexico and what constitutes 
U.S. domestic policy. Democrats in Congress 
have had little choice except to concede to har-
sher border controls toward Mexico in order 
to obtain Republican support for immigration 
reform, and even then, hard line conservatives 
remain opposed in principle to immigration 
reform if it amounts to an amnesty for undo-
cumented immigrants, recalling that the last 
time there was an amnesty the result was an 
increase in illegal migration across the border 
with Mexico. Irreconcilables include, among 
others, Republican Senators Jeff Sessions, Ala-
bama, and two Texas Senators, Ted Cruz and 
John Cornyn (Shear, 2013, p. A1). The irony 
is that border security is tighter now than at 
any previous time. Since 2005, the number 
of border patrol agents in the U.S. southwest 
has nearly doubled. The air wing of Customs 
and Border Protection is well equipped with 
air surveillance capacity. Technological sur-
veillance has become highly sophisticated and 
effective, and the entire operation has taken on 
a military command structure.
The Obama administration is caught 
between two very different visions of how to 
deal with Mexico. The President in his overall 
approach to narcotics trafficking and in spe-
cific reference to Mexico has argued from his 
first year in office that there needs to be more 
emphasis on economic development and less 
emphasis on the military approach to dealing 
with drugs. Obama has also sought to distan-
ce his administration to a considerable degree 
from the internal policies and especially the 
high levels of violence within Mexico. He 
stressed in his May 2013 meetings with Pre-
sident Peña Nieto that Mexico needs to set its 
own course on its security challenges, with the 
United States playing a purely supportive ro-
le. That approach coincides with Peña Nieto’s 
desire to reduce U.S. involvement in law en-
forcement on the Mexican side of the border, 
in part to reduce the tensions and distrust 
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that exist between Mexican and U.S. officials 
(Preston, 2013, p. A1; Shear, 2013, p. A10). 
The problems of organized crime, narcotics 
and arms trafficking, human rights violations 
and illegal migration are certain to remain 
persistent issues in the U.S.-Mexican bilateral 
relations for the foreseeable future.
coloMbia
The Obama administration overlapped with 
the last two years of the Presidency of Alvaro 
Uribe Vélez before the election of former Mi-
nister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos in 2010. 
The Obama administration inherited the 
ongoing Plan Colombia, which since 1999, 
when it was initiated by Presidents Clinton 
and Pastrana, had allocated approximately 
$6 billion, most of which was dedicated to 
assisting Colombia with military and natio-
nal police training as well as with military and 
communication technology. Initially, aid was 
strictly to be allocated to the effort to eradicate 
coca crops and counteract narcotics trafficking, 
but after 9/11 and the designation of farc and 
the eln as terrorist organizations the assistance 
took on a counter-insurgency dimension as 
well. The administration also inherited a free 
trade agreement that had been negotiated and 
signed during the George W. Bush presidency 
but not ratified, in large part because of oppo-
sition in Congress from Democrats critical of 
Colombia’s human rights record.
Controversial as his administration was, 
Uribe’s presidency had witnessed a dramatic 
shift in the strength of the state in its decades’ 
long conflict with farc. During the three years 
that Santos served as Minister of Defense, the 
state had established a police and/or military 
and civilian presence in all of the country’s mu-
nicipalities, many of which in the 1980s and 
1990s had been largely abandoned to farc, 
the eln or in some cases to paramilitaries. As 
well, the Colombian strategy of targeting farc 
leaders had born fruit, with two of the major 
figures killed in military action and the third, 
Mario Marulanda or Tiro Fijo, the founder 
and leader of farc, dying of natural causes. 
Santos had also presided over the Colom-
bian-U.S. joint operation “Operación Jaque”, 
which liberated former presidential candidate 
Ingrid Betancourt and another fourteen high 
profile farc hostages. This success had not 
been without controversy, however, with Co-
lombian and international ngos identifying 
significant levels of human rights violations 
and continued displacement of small town 
and rural Colombians uprooted by the esca-
lated violence of contending forces (unhchr, 
2006). Criticism of Colombian human rights 
violations was reinforced by President Uribe’s 
decision to relieve of duty three of his top ge-
nerals along with four colonels following the 
military killing of eleven men in the town of 
Soacha, individuals who were falsely reported 
by the military as insurgents. This was only a 
month prior to Obama’s election in Novem-
ber 2008. An indication of how pervasive the 
problem was is reflected in the fact that by 
2010, approximately four hundred soldiers 
and officers were being investigated by the mi-
litary for alleged involvement in extrajudicial 
killings, and the Prosecutor General’s Office 
was investigating several hundred others.
In addition to improvements in contai-
ning farc, extending the power of the state, 
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and attempting to address human rights vio-
lations, the Uribe government by the time 
Obama took office in 2009 had also begun 
a large scale demobilization of paramilitary 
organizations. Between 2003 and 2006, ap-
proximately 32,000 members of the auc, 
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, 
originally established in 1997 by Carlos Cas-
taño, had agreed to disband and surrender 
their weapons. In spite of the fact that many 
former paramilitaries simply blended in to 
other criminal organizations, the demobili-
zation process and the beginnings of an effort 
to address the victims of decades of violence 
and displacement were at least movement in 
the right direction.
Economic conditions also improved du-
ring the Uribe presidency, with a decline in 
the unemployment rate, increases in foreign 
direct investment and in the annual growth 
rate, at least until the economic slowdown in 
2008 in the context of the global recession. In 
2009, as the recession deepened and the war 
on drugs in Mexico called for increased resou-
rces, the Obama administration spoke about 
the need to reduce its financial commitment 
to Plan Colombia in fiscal year 2010 and to 
place more of the financial responsibility on 
Colombian authorities. At the same time the 
Obama administration perceived advances 
in human rights and in the credibility of the 
Colombian government to make the free trade 
agreement politically more palatable. With 
the transition to Santos from Uribe the U.S. 
Trade Representative, Ron Kirk, indicated the 
administration would be dusting off the trade 
agreement and renewing efforts at ratifica-
tion. Renewing the effort to ratify the trade 
agreement was controversial but it had strong 
support from Congressional conservatives and 
from leading conservative think tanks such as 
the Heritage Foundation, which suggested in 
the context of Santos’s inauguration that the 
Obama administration was “inching toward 
a mid-course correction in its policy” toward 
Colombia (Walser, 2010).
On the military side, in 2009, Uribe ne-
gotiated an agreement with the Obama admi-
nistration providing the United States access 
to seven military bases. The U.S. military was 
anxious to conclude this agreement since the 
government of Rafael Vicente Correa in Ecua-
dor in 2008 announced it would not be re-
newing the ten year agreement providing U.S. 
Air Force access to the major base at Manta. At 
the time of the decision there were 450 U.S. 
Air Force personnel and contractors at Manta. 
The Washington Post captured the prevailing 
political mood in pro-Chávez Ecuador at the 
time in quoting Gustavo Larrea, Ecuador’s 
security minister: “The U.S. stopped being the 
benchmark of what is good for Latin America,” 
he said. “Because Latin America did everything 
that the U.S. asked it to do and wasn’t able to 
get out of poverty, the North American myth 
lost political weight” (Partlow, 2008). The 
most significant and controversial of the seven 
Colombian bases was the Palanquero base nor-
thwest of Bogotá, adjacent to the Magdalena 
River. The agreement provided for the U.S. 
to invest $46 million in upgraded facilities 
at the base, which already had the capacity 
to accommodate100 planes, including C-17 
troop carriers. At the same time, the agreement 
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did not increase the number of U.S. military 
personnel in the country, which continued to 
be limited to 1,400 by U.S. law.
The intent of the base, according to U.S. 
Air Force documents, was “to leverage existing 
infrastructure to the maximum extent possible, 
improve the U.S. ability to respond rapidly to 
crisis, and assure regional access and presence 
at minimum cost. […] Palanquero will provi-
de joint use capability to the U.S. Army, Air 
Force, Marines, and U.S. Interagency aircraft 
and personnel”5.
The regional reaction to the agreement 
was almost uniformly negative. Venezuelan 
President Chávez was predictably the most 
outspoken, claiming that Colombia had com-
promised its own sovereignty and that of its 
neighbors. Chavez sabre rattled and ordered 
troops to the Colombian border. Wisely, 
President Uribe ignored the action. Ecuador 
and Brazil, however, were equally concerned, 
with Brazil suggesting that the agreement, on 
which Brazil was not consulted, threatened to 
destabilize the relationship with Colombia’s 
neighbors. President Michelle Bachelet of 
Chile also expressed concern. unasur met to 
discuss the agreement and President Lula of 
Brazil suggested that President Obama should 
be invited to explain the U.S. position. Co-
lombian Deputy Foreign Minister, Clemencia 
Forero, who represented Colombia at the 2009 
unasur meeting in Quito, said the agreement 
only provided limited access for U.S. personnel 
and was focused on drug trafficking. “There 
haven’t been any foreign military bases in Co-
lombia and there won’t be any,” she was quoted 
as saying. “The bases remain under Colombian 
jurisdiction and sovereignty”6. Critics were not 
limited to the neighboring countries. A num-
ber of Colombian legislators also denounced 
the agreement. As well, a lawyers’ group filed 
suit on the grounds that without legislative 
approval the agreement was unconstitutional, 
and in a ruling the following year the Colom-
bian Constitutional Court agreed (Brodzinsky, 
2010).
President Obama sought to allay fears of 
a U.S. military buildup in the region. He told 
Reuters that “We have had a security agree-
ment with Colombia for many years now. 
We have updated that agreement. We have 
no intent in establishing a U.S. military base 
in Colombia.” He added that the agreement 
was a continuation of current U.S. assistan-
ce to Colombia. “We have no intention of 
sending large numbers of additional troops 
into Colombia, and we have every interest in 
seeing Colombia and its neighbors operate 
peacefully”7. In April 2012 President Obama 
met with President Santos and signed a new 
U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Se-
curity. The White House said in a statement 
that discussions between technical experts and 
policy officials would focus on four key areas 
that align with hemispheric citizen security 
goals and priorities. Those included fighting 
5 Reported in The Progressive (March 2010).
6 http://colombiareports.com/lula-suggests-meeting-with-obama-about-us-military-in-colombia/.
7 Reuters (August 7, 2009).
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narcotics trafficking, combating crime, stren-
gthening institutions, and fostering resilient 
communities. Both countries, the White Hou-
se said, would develop complementary security 
assistance programs and operational efforts to 
support hemispheric and international partner 
nations afflicted by effects of transnational 
organized crime8.
That same month, Defense Secretary 
Leon Panetta assured his counterparts at the 
2012 Conference of Defense Ministers of the 
Americas that the United States had no inten-
tion of establishing permanent military bases 
in the Americas. In April that year he met in 
Bogotá with his Colombian counterpart Juan 
Carlos Pinzón Bueno. At meetings in the capi-
tal and at Tolemaida, the large airbase near the 
city, Panetta reaffirmed the U.S. commitment 
to assist Colombia in the defeat of farc. He 
also noted that recent Colombian success in 
addressing its security situation was enabling 
it to cooperate in assisting other countries, 
notably in Central America9.
Until Santos succeeded Uribe as President 
in 2010 opposition in the United States to 
the free trade agreement was insurmountable. 
The Colombian Senate ratified the agreement 
in October 2007 by a vote of 54-16 and the 
Colombian Constitutional Court approved 
the agreement the following year. There were 
concerns in both the United States and Co-
lombia about the agreement, especially among 
human rights groups and organized labor. In 
Colombia the cgt, the General Confederation 
of Labor, opposed the agreement. Prior to rati-
fication, the eln (National Liberation Army) 
indicated that it would agree on a unilateral 
ceasefire only if the government did not ratify 
the free trade agreement (Rodríguez, 2007). 
The Polo Democrático Party opposed the 
agreement. Even before Obama had obtained 
the Democratic Party nomination for Presi-
dent, Polo Democrático wrote to Congresswo-
man Nancy Pelosi, and Senators Harry Reid, 
Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama in April 
2008 urging the Democrats to vote against 
the agreement, arguing that the “fta benefits 
only a select minority in the United States, 
not the general population. For example, the 
destruction of Colombian agriculture caused 
by the fta will stimulate the planting of coca in 
Colombia and more drug dealing in the streets 
of American cities”10. Colombian Liberal Sena-
tor Cecilia López objected to the fast tracking 
of debate in the Colombian Congress by the 
Uribistas (Semana, 2007). In the United States, 
organized labor was outspoken in opposition, 
notably the United Steelworkers, which oppo-
sed at the outset and continued to do so even 
after it was finally ratified in 2011 because of 
the targeting of labor activists by paramilitary 
organizations. Democrats in Congress indica-
ted that they would not support an agreement 
unless there were clear guarantees that the 
8 http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116054. 
9 http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116054.
10 Letter of April 4, 2008. Recuperado de http://colombiasupport.net/2008/04/letter-from-the-polo-democratico-
party-to-nancy-pelosi-on-the-fta/.
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Colombian government was not supporting 
paramilitary groups, a position that reflected 
the accusations in Colombia of links between 
Uribe’s government and the paramilitaries11. 
Senator Hillary Clinton was outspoken in 
her opposition to the agreement during her 
bid for the Democratic Party presidential no-
mination. The New York Times editorialized 
in October 2007 that of the trade agreements 
before Congress should be delayed. “Uribe 
and his government,” the Times contended, 
“have not done enough to bring to justice the 
paramilitary thugs and their political backers” 
(2007, p. A18). Republican Senator Richard 
Lugar responded with an op-ed in the Miami 
Herald in which he argued that the U.S. would 
be assisting Colombia to solve some of its cha-
llenges by ratifying the trade agreement. The 
Washington Post concurred, editorializing on 
November 9 that it was time for the Democrats 
to assess the agreement on its merits and that 
as much as the country’s progress was fragile 
and incomplete, there had been improvement 
in the application of justice to those responsi-
ble for the violence (Semana, 2007; Iragorri, 
2007).
Given the broad range of opposition to 
the agreement from his own party, Obama 
made no move to encourage ratification until 
after Santos was in power in Colombia and 
the Republican Party had gained control of 
the House of Representatives in the 2010 mid-
term elections. In order to move the agreement 
forward in Congress Obama and Santos agreed 
on a range of provisions which Colombia was 
expected to implement to protect labor rights 
(The Economist, 2011). Under the Colombian 
Action Plan Related to Labor Rights, Colom-
bia passed legislation criminalizing interferen-
ce in the execution of labor rights, advanced 
fines for maintaining employment relations-
hips that undermine workers’ rights, expanded 
protection for union members, and reformed 
the procedures in the Office of the Prosecutor 
General to improve the prosecution of cases 
involving the killing of union members12.
The Obama administration stressed the 
mutual advantages of the agreement. For Co-
lombia, it predicted that within five years the 
enhanced trade would increase the Colombian 
growth rate by half a percentage point. The 
Office of the US Trade Representative noted 
that in 2010 Colombia was already the second 
highest importer of U.S. agricultural exports 
in Latin America. The agreement also opened 
up the Colombian service sector market to 
American providers13. The Economist reported 
that it was expected that Colombian exports to 
the United States under the agreement would 
increase from $17 billion to $50 billion a year 
(The Economist, 2011).
When the trade agreement finally came to 
a vote in October 2011, Democratic opposi-
tion was still strong, and Obama, like Clinton 
11 Democrats in Congress were also successful in reducing U.S. military aid to Colombia and diverting a higher 
percentage of that aid to economic development and strengthening the judicial system. Democratic members of 
Congress also expressed concern about the marginalization of Afro-Colombian communities (Ikeda, 2007).
12 www.ustr.gov/uscolombiatpa.
13 Ibid.
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in 1994 with the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, had to count on Republican vo-
tes. The House voted 262-167 and the Senate 
66-33 in favor. In the Senate, Democrats were 
divided. Democratic Senator Max Baucus, 
Chair of the Finance Committee, was a leading 
supporter of the agreement, but Ohio Demo-
cratic Senator Sherrod Brown an outspoken 
opponent. Senate majority leader Harry Reid 
voted against the treaty. In the House, Maine 
Democrat Mike Michaud indicated his nega-
tive vote was based on concern over potential 
job losses to other countries; Democrat Lloyd 
Doggett of Texas suggested his concerns fo-
cused on the continuing problems of human 
rights violations, and Michigan Democrat 
Sander Levin opposed on grounds related to 
the rights of labor (Applebaum, 2011, p. A1).
When the agreement was ratified in 2011, 
the website of the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative featured statements of various 
interest groups supporting the trade pact. None 
of the statements came from an ngo or trade 
union14. Leon Valencia, writing in Semana in 
April 2011, argued that the final terms of the 
agreement represented a victory for Colombian 
labor because it had been successful in obliging 
Colombia to protect and extend the rights of 
labor in the face of those who sought to repress 
those rights. Valencia (2011) noted that bet-
ween 1986 and 2010 there had been more than 
2700 trade unionists murdered in Colombia. 
Trade union concerns persisted, however. In 
April 2012 shortly before President Obama left 
for the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena 
the President of the afl-cio, Richard Tremka, 
wrote to Obama urging him to continue to 
press Colombian authorities on the killing 
of labor activists (Calmes, 2012, p. A12). In 
Colombia there was opposition from labor 
groups, and from smaller-scale farmers in rice 
and corn production as well as dairy farmers 
and poultry producers. The Uribe government 
had set up a system of subsidies for small far-
mers, but the program became mired in scandal 
when funds intended for the smaller producers 
were diverted to large landowners. Nor did the 
Colombian government take advantage of the 
five years between negotiation and ratification 
of the agreement to engage in the infrastruc-
ture renewal that was deemed necessary for an 
effective implementation of the agreement, in-
cluding upgrading port facilities and improving 
highways (The Economist, 2011).
conclusion
The record of the Obama administration 
toward Latin America since early 2009 has 
been, as suggested here, a very mixed one 
in which rhetoric and good intentions have 
been challenged time and again by the rea-
lities of domestic and international relations 
and power politics. Obama has maneuvered 
around these shoals with some political skill, 
retreating when necessary to a position of poli-
tical pragmatism. The administration has been 
beset by problems larger than Latin American 
relations: winding down large scale military 
commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan; the 
14 www.ustr.gov/uscolombiatpa.
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waning of the euphoria that accompanied the 
initial stages of the “Arab Spring;” the conti-
nuing need to address the financial crisis and 
its fallout; responding to challenges posed by 
Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. 
Perhaps most importantly the United States 
has had to come to terms with the fact that it 
has limited capacity to dictate the course of 
events in Latin America.
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